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A B S T R A C T
With increasing flood risk due to climate change and socioeconomic trends, governments are under pressure to
continue implementing flood protection measures, such as dikes, to reduce flood risk. However, research sug-
gests that a sole focus on government-funded flood protection leads to an adverse increase in exposure as people
and economic activities tend to concentrate in protected areas. Moreover, governmental flood protection can
reduce the incentive for autonomous adaptation by local households, which paradoxically results in more severe
consequences if an extreme flood event occurs. This phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘safe development
paradox’ or ‘levee effect’ and is generally not accounted for in existing flood risk models used to assess devel-
opments in future flood risk under climate change. In this study we assess the impact of extreme flood events for
the European Union using a large-scale agent-based model (ABM). We quantify how the safe development
paradox affects (1) population growth and the increase in exposed property values, (2) the reduction in in-
vestments to flood-proof buildings as public protection increases, and (3) the increase in potential damage
should a flood occur. For this analysis, we apply an ABM that integrates the dynamic behaviour of governments
and residents into a large-scale flood risk assessment framework, in which we include estimates of changing
population growth. We find that the impact of extreme flood events increases considerably when governments
provide high protection levels, especially in large metropolitan areas. Moreover, we demonstrate how policy that
stimulates the flood-proofing of buildings can largely counteract the effects of the safe development paradox.
1. Introduction
In the past decade, floods in Europe have affected over 4 million
inhabitants and their assets, killing almost a thousand people and
leaving over five thousand homeless (Guha-Sapir et al., 2017). The
2013 floods alone, which affected most of Central Europe, resulted in
reported damages of 18 billion euro. During the period of 2006−2013
over two hundred minor and major flood events cost a total of 52 billion
euro in reported damages (Guha-Sapir et al., 2017). These already dire
numbers are expected to be aggravated by an increase in extreme
events due to climate change (IPCC, 2012), and a growth of exposed
assets due to socio-economic developments (Jongman et al., 2012). The
high risk from flooding has prompted the creation of several policy
frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(UN, 2015), the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
(UNFCCC, 2013), and the EU Floods Directive (EU, 2007). These
frameworks attempt to emphasize a holistic risk reduction approach,
where governments, institutions and households are all responsible for
reducing risk. However, in practice the situation often differs because in
many countries dikes and other large engineering structures remain the
prevailing flood risk management strategies (Harries and Penning-
Rowsell, 2011; Hartmann and Spit, 2016).
Even though these large engineering structures are often cost-ef-
fective, they lead to the ‘promise of protection’ (Hartmann and
Spit, 2016), which creates a sense of safety among those who reside in
the protected area. This sense of safety can lead to adverse effects,
where, for instance, self-reliance and the reduction of local-scale vul-
nerability (e.g. through flood-proofing buildings) is neglected
(IPCC, 2012). Moreover, development in low-lying areas is often ac-
celerated after the installation of flood protection (Burby, 2006;
Baldassarre et al., 2013; Ludy and Kondolf, 2012; Sivapalan et al.,
2012). Paradoxically, this means that the reduction of hazard
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probability through increasing flood protection may lead to an increase
in exposure and vulnerability. Subsequently, if a flood disaster strikes
then its consequences are more severe than they would have been
otherwise (Baldassarre et al., 2018; IPCC, 2012). This process, first
described by White (1942), is often referred to as ‘the safe development
paradox’ (Burby, 2006), the ‘levee effect’ (Tobin, 1995) or the ‘dike
paradox’ (Hartmann and Spit, 2016). We adopt the term safe develop-
ment paradox in this paper.
Several recent studies focusing on population growth have analysed
how the safe development paradox increases population growth in
protected areas, and, in contrast, decreases population growth in areas
where a flood has recently occurred (Burby, 2006; Collenteur et al.,
2015; Husby et al., 2014). Other studies have used a conceptual ap-
proach to study the mechanisms of the safe development paradox
(Baldassarre et al., 2018; Baldassarre et al., 2013; Sivapalan et al.,
2012). Although the effects of flood protection on population growth
are well known, current scientific models for flood risk projections
rarely address the safe development paradox, and as such do not pro-
vide a realistic assessment of the impact of extreme events
(Baldassarre et al., 2018; Baldassarre et al., 2018).
This knowledge gap is partly caused by the common exclusion of
micro-level behaviour from flood risk assessments, such as adaptation
efforts by households (Aerts et al., 2018). Neglecting micro-level be-
haviour reduces the capacity of analytical frameworks to quantify the
risk reduction potential of policies that counteract the effects of the safe
development paradox. For instance, a solution to the paradox might be
found in building-level protection measures that reduce the impact of
extreme events, such as wet-proofing (i.e. reducing damage while still
allowing water to enter) and dry-proofing (i.e. reducing damage by
preventing the entry of water) of buildings, or elevation (i.e. reducing
damage by raising structures). When dikes fail or are overtopped, such
building-level measures can greatly reduce the damage done by ex-
treme events, as shown by Kreibich et al. (2005) and Poussin et al.
(2015). Accordingly, the integration of micro-level decision-making in
flood risk assessments is important to quantify the effects of the safe
development paradox, and to guide policy makers in their decision-
making.
In this study we provide a quantitative assessment of the safe de-
velopment paradox by applying an augmented agent-based model
(ABM) developed by Haer et al. (2019), which integrates the dynamic
adaptive behaviour of both governments and EU residents in a large-
scale flood risk assessment model. The reasons for applying an ABM, are
that we aim to capture the system outcome of the safe development
paradox resulting from the autonomous adaptation decisions from a
highly heterogenous population of households, which for example
differ with respect to their risk situation, value of houses, costs of
adaptation measures, and flood experience. An ABM approach is
especially useful for capturing this heterogeneous behaviour through
different behavioural rules that range from rational to boundedly ra-
tional behaviour. Moreover, ABMs are suitable for modelling interac-
tions in behaviour. In our application households decisions interact
with the autonomous adaptation decision by heterogenous government
agents throughout Europe that, for example, depend on the risk situa-
tion and the initial level of protection, and also follow different beha-
vioural rules ranging from proactive to reactive, and include building
codes, or policies that stimulate households to act more rational. Our
study adds to a growing field of ABM applications in flood risk analysis,
which focussed on evacuation (Dawson et al., 2011), climate change
migration (Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris, 2012), housing markets
(Filatova et al., 2011; Filatova et al.,2009) and community mitigation
(Dubbelboer et al., 2017; Jenkins et al., 2017; Tonn and
Guikema, 2017). In particular, the ABM includes a new module that
estimates the change in population growth resulting from either in-
creased public protection or flood events. With this, we can show how
the safe development paradox affects population growth and the re-
sulting increase in exposed property values. Moreover, we analyse the
fall in demand for building-level investments as public protection in-
creases, and the resulting increase in damage should a flood occur. We
also demonstrate how this safe development effect can be largely
counteracted by steering the behaviour of residents towards econom-
ically desirable behaviour, for instance by providing financial in-
centives for flood-proofing buildings. Our work contributes to the
policy design of EU member states under the EU Floods Directive.
2. Model approach
We use and augment the model developed by Haer et al. (2019),
which incorporates the dynamic adaptive behaviour of governments
and households into a flood hazard model, and returns the monetary
expression of yearly average flood risk in the form of the expected
annual damage (EAD) for the entire EU (for a detailed model descrip-
tion including relevant changes, see supplementary material A. For the
original model see https://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/14/4/
044022/media/erl_14_044022_sd.pdf). Building on the work of
Haer et al. (2019), we integrate a new algorithm into the model, which
accounts for the change in population growth (Burby, 2006;
Collenteur et al., 2015; Husby et al., 2014) as a result of flood occur-
rence and increased governmental protection (Section 2.3.2). Ad-
ditionally, in this study we examine the absolute flood impact for dif-
ferent return periods in the form of expected damage (ED). This
augmented ABM can thus be used to analyse the consequences of the
safe development paradox. To clarify the difference between the EAD
and ED, we assume a hypothetical situation where one 100-year flood
occurs and produces damage X; then the ED would be X given the ab-
solute damage, and the EAD would be X/100 to produce a yearly
average damage. In reality, the EAD is calculated by taking the integral
over all flood return periods, i.e., all calculated ED values.
Moreover, with this ABM setup we can quantify how well-intended
proactive government strategies can lead to lower flood risk (EAD) but
higher impacts of extreme events (ED) as households become less in-
clined to take protective efforts. This is shown schematically in Fig. 1.
For the purpose of clarity, we discuss the model in Sections 2.1–2.4 and
highlight the augmentations, details are discussed in Supplementary
Material A. In the model, during each one-year time-step, the flood
hazard and associated EAD and ED change dynamically and flood
events occur stochastically (Section 2.1), socio-economic change affects
exposed value and population, and population growth causes an in-
crease in residential building surface and exposed value (Section 2.1).
Moreover, governments can adapt by raising protection standards
(Section 2.2), and residents can adapt by either dry-proofing or ele-
vating residential buildings (Section 2.3). By modelling the adaptive
responses of both governments and residents, we can analyse the in-
teractions and feedbacks between the adopted protective strategies.
2.1. Flood risk and flood impact
Flood inundation maps for the set of return periods (5-, 10-, 25-, 50-,
100-, 250-, 500- and 1000-year return periods) are developed on a
30”x30” resolution following the GLOFRIS modelling cascade
(Haer et al., 2019; Ward et al., 2013; Winsemius et al., 2013). As this
study focuses on behaviour and not on climate change scenarios, we
show the results for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 in
the main text and the RCP2.6 scenario in Supplementary Material B.
Each 30”x30” cell has a specific exposed value based on the land use
class, country, and share of residential building surface (Haer et al.,
2019). The ED for each return period is calculated for each 30”x30”
grid cell as the product of the inundation depth in each cell, the ex-
posure, and the depth−damage curve. The latter variable describes the
relation between inundation depth and damage to the value of exposure
(de Moel et al., 2015; Merz et al., 2010; Ward et al., 2013). The EAD is
then determined by approximating the integral over the ED of all return
periods (de Moel et al., 2015; Merz et al., 2010; Ward et al., 2013).
T. Haer, et al. Global Environmental Change 60 (2020) 102009
2
The exposed residential building area and the value it represents
follows a spatial-temporal function that estimates residential building
surface based on population levels (Haer et al., 2019). The yearly
change in population levels initially follows socio-economic pathway
(SSP) data at 30”x30” resolution (Haer et al., 2019; van Vuuren et al.,
2007). While in principle all SSPs can be coupled to all RCPs, we pro-
vide estimates of the lower and upper bounds by coupling the RCP2.6
pathway to the SSP1 pathway, and the RCP8.5 pathway to the SSP5
pathway. Under the baseline settings, population levels− and therefore
exposed residential building surface− are unaffected by the occurrence
of a flood and the construction of a dike. This assumption is common in
risk assessments, although it disregards the influence of flood events
and increased protection on population growth observed in the litera-
ture (Burby, 2006; Collenteur et al., 2015; Husby et al., 2014). In
Section 2.3.2 we describe a new methodology that integrates changes in
population growth as a result of flood occurrences or increased gov-
ernment protection.
The ED is further influenced by the adaptive behaviour of govern-
ments and residents (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Moreover, to be able to
model reactive behaviour, flood events occur stochastically in model
runs, with a probability associated with the return period: for example,
the yearly stochastic probability p associated with a 100-year return
period is 0.01.
2.2. Government decision-making
Governments can adapt through separate government agents in
each NUTS 3 region by increasing dike heights to raise protection
standards. Initial protection standards and dike heights at t= 0 (2010)
are derived from the FLOPROS database (Haer et al., 2019;
Scussolini et al., 2016). The decision to raise protection standards is
based on a cost−benefit analysis (CBA), calculated for each
30”x30”grid cell and summed for the NUTS 3 region, which follows in



















The net present value NPV is calculated for protection standards PS
that protect against a return period i over the lifespan of a dike L. We
use a lifespan of 100 years, similarly to Aerts et al. (2014). The benefit
Bt,PSi is the net EAD reduced, i.e., the EAD reduced by the evaluated
protection standard PSi minus the EAD reduced by the current protec-
tion standard PScurrent. The additional yearly maintenance costs Ct,PSi are
the net maintenance cost of raising the protection standard PSi above
the current protection standard PScurrent. The investment costs C0,PSi
represent the initial cost of increasing the dike height. We use a dis-
count rate r of 4%, in line with the recommended discount rate in the
EU1. Time lags between decision and implementation are not explicitly
considered. We model two behaviour scenarios that represent current
and optimal behaviour; one in which governments are reactive, and
decide whether or not to increase protection standards only after a
flood occurs; and a scenario in which governments are proactive, and
decide whether or not to increase protection standards in six-year cy-
cles. These approaches are representative of currently observed beha-
viour (Adger et al., 2005; Albright, 2011; IPCC, 2012; Johnson et al.,
2005) and desirable optimal behaviour. The latter approach is similar
to the one taken by the government in the Netherlands, which is cur-
rently one of the most proactive governments concerning flood risk
reduction (Kind, 2014). As both approaches are based on CBA, proac-
tive governments are more likely to raise protection standards and are
thus potentially more subjected to the safe development effects of dike
construction on population levels and the adaptive behaviour of
households than reactive governments.
2.3. Household decision-making
2.3.1. Adaptation decision
The adaptive behaviour of households in each 30”x30” grid cell
follows a discounted expected utility (DEU) model, which represents
mainstream economic theory for decision-making under risk. At each
time-step households compare the DEU of two strategies: implementing
loss-reducing measures, and doing nothing. The strategy that yields the
highest DEU is executed. The evaluation of DEU is performed separately
for existing unprotected building surface, which residents can dry-
proof, and newly developed building surface, which residents can ele-
vate. This approach is taken as dry-proofing is the most cost-effective
measure for existing buildings, while elevating is the cost-effective
measure for newly developed buildings. Dry-proofing reduces 85%
(Aerts and Botzen, 2011) of the damage done to existing dry-proofed
residential building surface, while elevating shifts the depth−damage
curve upwards by 1 m for the existing elevated residential building
surface in a grid cell. The stylized form of the DEU is as follows:
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The DEU is calculated for the two different strategies str as the in-
tegral over the probabilities p associated with each return period i, and
the utility of the expected annual benefits EAB of the strategy str. The
calculation is done over the lifespan of the measure (75 years for dry-
proofing and 100 years for elevation, see supplementary material A). As
the probability of a flood event can be reduced over time by govern-
ment decision-making (Section 2.2), the decision made by households is
also influenced by government action. This can lead to the safe devel-
opment paradox, where households do not act as protection is already
provided. Budget constraints are not explicitly taken into account. The
utility function follows U(x) = ln x (Haer et al., 2016). The
β = −10 α2 1t represents how perceived flood probabilities deviate from
objective probabilities, where αt = 1 if a flood occurs in the NUTS 3
region where residents live, and αt = αt-1 / 1.6 if no flood occurs. This
represents boundedly rational households that overestimate the prob-
ability of a flood if one has just occurred, and that begin to under-
estimate the probability of a flood in periods where no flood occurs
(Haer et al., 2016). This behaviour is often observed in reality
(Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther et al., 1985). We also run the model for
β = 1, causing Eq. (2) to reflect a rational, risk-averse decision process
where the perceived risk is equal to the objective risk. The rational,
risk-averse decision process reflects households that are not influenced
by underestimation or overestimation, and that have perfect knowledge
of the risk situation. Such behaviour can be stimulated, for instance, by
providing incentives to correct for boundedly rational behaviour, as
explained further in Section 2.4.
2.3.2. Spatiotemporal population dynamics
We also model the change in population growth (i.e. households
moving in or out of the area) resulting from flood occurrence or in-
creased protection (Baldassarre et al., 2015). Previous ABMs have in-
cluded the location decision explicitly (Tonn and Guikema, 2017), but
such studies are often forced to implement ad hoc decision rules due to
a lack of empirical data for calibration and validation. On a small scale,
studies by Filatova et al. (2015, 2011) show how ABMs can be com-
bined with empirical data to model, for instance, the urban housing
market, which is influenced by risk and steered by the presence of local
amenities. However, as large-scale empirical data needed to derive
behavioural rules is often missing, we choose to model the location
decision implicitly based on empirical results and applied to the EU. We
do so by adjusting the percentage growth as given by the SSP
(Section 2.1) with the marginal impact on population growth from
flood events and increased protection, as empirically determined by
Husby et al. (2014) (Table 1). Husby et al. (2014) carried out a so-called
dynamic difference-in-difference statistical analysis on municipality-
level population data of the Netherlands for the period 1960−2000.
This study offers the only empirical data for changes in population
growth that result from both flood occurrence and increased protection,
as far as we are aware. In this difference-in-difference analysis,
Husby et al. (2014) compared population growth in areas that were
affected by increased public protection with population growth in areas
that were not affected, with the use of municipality-level census data.
Note that the change in population growth influences the exposed
value, and thus potentially increases EAD and ED. However, an increase
in exposed value could also lead to increased protective efforts by
governments (Section 2.2) and households (Section 2.3.1), and can thus
indirectly reduce EAD and ED. As such, including the effect on popu-
lation represents a neutral change with respect to the adaptive beha-
viour.
We use the results of Husby et al. (2014) as a proxy for other EU
countries. To address the uncertainty associated with extrapolating
population growth dynamics of the Netherlands to Europe, we assume
that for any given country the growth effects in a specific year lie within
the triangular distribution of the estimate found for the Netherlands.
Clearly, the marginal effect of protection and flooding on population
growth varies in both time and space, and there are uncertainties
around both the shape and the median of the distribution. The strategy
employed in this paper is to think of the estimates from
Husby et al. (2014) as an upper bound for this effect. By specifying the
function as a triangular distribution, we capture the uncertainty around
the distribution of the marginal effect of protection on population
growth. Hence, the usage of the triangular distribution in this paper is
similar to that in the specification of the climate damage function, for
example in the Integrated Assessment Model PAGE. In the event where
a flood occurs in a region or when a dike is constructed, growth ac-
cording to the SSP data is adjusted with a draw from the triangular
distribution from the time period ‘Event’. In the years following the
event, the SSP data is adjusted with a draw from the triangular dis-
tribution of the appropriate time period. In addition to this stochastic
approach to account for uncertainty, we provide a sensitivity analysis
(see Supplementary Material C) in which we analyse the change in ED
resulting from population change in the case where the estimates in
Table 1 are twice as large, or twice as small. We run this sensitivity
analysis for the regions in three distinctly different countries: the
Netherlands, where government protection is high; Bulgaria, where
government protection is low; and Italy, where some regions have high
and others have low government protection against flooding.
2.4. Behaviour scenarios
To quantify the effects of the safe development paradox, we run the
model for scenarios that exclude or include the population dynamics
resulting from dike construction or flood events (SFDpop). By doing so,
we can compare the common approach of flood risk assessment studies
to a more realistic approach where population effects are taken into
account. Furthermore, we assume as the baseline that households are
boundedly rational (BouRaHH), so that they underestimate and over-
estimate risk, and that governments act reactively (ReaGov). We com-
pare this scenario to a scenario in which governments are proactive
(ProGov), as envisioned by the EU Floods Directive. Moreover, we
analyse how mandatory building codes (i.e. elevation of new buildings
considering its cost-efficiency) reduce the effect of the safe develop-
ment paradox. Also, to analyse a shift towards not only a proactive
government, but also towards policies that steer households towards
rational behaviour, we include a scenario where households behave
rationally (RaHH). This can be achieved by providing financial in-
centives that represent the uncertain outcome of the future, like the
perceived risk reduction obtained from flood-proofing a home, with a
more certain direct financial incentive, like a tax reduction or discount
on an insurance premium, which reflects the reduced objective risk by
flood-proofing a home. If designed well, such policies steer behaviour to
become more rational, which is modelled here by assuming β = 1. The
various combinations of behavioural scenarios described in this section
are summarized in Table 2.
3. Results
3.1. Reducing flood risk
Fig. 2 shows the flood risk, expressed in EAD, after the adaptation
by governments and residents of four different scenarios for the EU. To
highlight changes when including or excluding the safe development
population changes (SFDpop), we exclude here the building codes
scenario and the steering of households towards rational behaviour
(RaHH).The results show that flood risk is only marginally influenced
by including or excluding SFDpop, despite the increase in exposed value
caused by population growth (see Supplementary Material D). As the
EAD is determined from the integral over the ED of flood events with
T. Haer, et al. Global Environmental Change 60 (2020) 102009
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different return periods, events with more frequent return periods (i.e.
high probabilities) have a strong influence on the EAD, and those with
less frequent return periods (i.e. low probabilities) count very little
towards the EAD. Even in the reactive scenarios, over 50% of the re-
gions offer a protection standard of 50 years or more, and therefore any
increase in exposed value will cause only a minor change in EAD. The
results thus show that including SFDpop does not significantly change
previous conclusions regarding the EAD (Haer et al., 2019); proactive
behaviour by governments leads to a significant reduction in EAD
compared to reactive behaviour. When EU governments act proactively,
the EAD to residential buildings is approximately 4.5 billion euro in
2050. In contrast, the EAD rises to approximately 10 billion when EU
governments remain reactive. While this establishes the economic
benefit of proactive behaviour, a potentially increased impact of ex-
treme events due to the safe development paradox is not clearly visible
when analysing the EAD, which is a yearly average. Therefore, in
Section 3.2 we investigate the ED, which is an absolute value that de-
notes the consequences of flooding, for three extreme flood return
periods.
3.2. Increasing flood impact
3.2.1. Increased impact due to changing population growth
Fig. 3 shows how including SFDpop influences the ED in 2050 for
three extreme flood return periods: 100 years, 500 years and 1000
years. The top panels (A−C) show the difference in ED for the scenarios
in which governments act reactively and where we include or exclude
the safe development effects on population growth
(EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop− EDReaGov+BouRaHH). In the reactive
scenario, dike heights often remain at the same level as they are in-
itialized in 2010 and flood events can still be considered infrequent.
Therefore, the difference in ED between the two reactive scenarios that
include or exclude SFDpop is relatively small. We find that when in-
cluding SFDpop there is a mean increase of 58000 164000 and
183000 euro/km2 for the 100-year, 500-year and 1000-year return
period floods, respectively, in the reactive scenarios. However, these
results are skewed upwards by some regions with a high exposed value.
When comparing the median values, we find a relatively small increase
of 15000 42000 and 45000 euro/km2 for the 100-year, 500-year and
1000-year return period floods, respectively.
The lower panels (D−F) of Fig. 3 show the difference in ED for the
scenarios in which governments act proactively, and in which we in-
clude (EDProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop) and exclude (EDProGov+BouRaHH) the
influences of government protection and flood events on population
growth. In contrast to the reactive scenario, when governments act
proactively the protection standards are frequently raised. As a con-
sequence of doing so, and of the related population growth in the
SFDpop scenario, there is a stronger increase in exposed value in the
proactive scenarios than in the reactive scenarios. Now the results show
that there is an average increase of 99000 530000 and 925000 euro/
km2 and a median increase of 16000 142000 and 240000 euro/km2 for
the 100-year, 500-year and 1000 year return period floods, respec-
tively.
When aggregating the ED of all regions in the EU, we find that in-
cluding SFDpop in the reactive scenario increases the ED by approxi-
mately 4 billion, 12 billion and 14 billion euro for the 100-year, 500-
year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. Including SFDpop in
the proactive scenarios leads to an aggregated increase of
Table 1
Percentage point change in population growth as a result of an event, which is either a flood event or the construction of dikes (empirical estimates from Husby et al.,
2014, upper and lower bound determined by a triangular distribution).
Flood Protection
Time period (year) Estimate (Δ %) Upper bound (Δ %) Lower bound (Δ %) Estimate (Δ %) Upper bound (Δ %) Lower bound (Δ %)
Event -0.00747 −0.00061 −0.01433 -0.00262 0.002675 −0.00792
Event+ 1 0.000999 0.004739 −0.00274 0.006459 0.012588 0.00033
Event+ 2 0.003199 0.007978 −0.00158 0.008387 0.014519 0.002254
Event+ 3 0.001904 0.007296 −0.00349 0.005651 0.013791 −0.00249
Event+ 4 -0.00219 0.001913 −0.00628 0.00706 0.013161 0.000959
Event+ 5 -0.00532 −0.00074 −0.00991 0.008815 0.015149 0.00248
Event+ 6 -0.00075 0.00494 -0.00644 0.010022 0.017794 0.002251
Event+ 7 -0.00084 0.005787 −0.00746 0.007403 0.013531 0.001275
Event+ 8 -0.00447 0.003985 −0.01293 0.010347 0.017717 0.002977
Event+ 9 -0.00358 0.001532 −0.00869 0.009942 0.017097 0.002788
Event+ 10 −0.00388 −4.22E-05 −0.00771 0.008795 0.015393 0.002196
Event+ 11 −0.0014 0.005167 −0.00796 0.009364 0.014929 0.003798
Event+ 12 0.000696 0.009225 −0.00783 0.006491 0.011528 0.001455
Event+ 13 0.004223 0.010531 −0.00208 0.0042 0.008513 −0.00011
Event+ 14 0.000918 0.006702 −0.00487 0.007572 0.013313 0.001832
Event+ 15 0.003611 0.012444 −0.00522 0.003245 0.00835 −0.00186
Event+>y15 0.001718 0.004261 −0.00083 0.006094 0.00768 0.004507
Table 2
Behaviour scenarios and summary of the behaviour of governments and households for each scenario.
Scenario ID Description
ReaGov+BouRaHH Reactive governments and boundedly rational households
ProGov+BouRaHH Proactive governments and boundedly rational households
ReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop Reactive governments and boundedly rational households
Population growth is influenced by protection and flood events
ProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop Proactive governments and boundedly rational households
Population growth is influenced by increased protection or flood events
ProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop+
buildingcodes
Proactive governments and boundedly rational households
Population growth is influenced by increased protection or flood events.
New buildings are elevated.
ProGov+RaHH+SFDpop Proactive governments and rational households
Population growth is influenced by increased protection or flood events
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approximately 3 billion, 38 billion and 67 billion euro for the 100-year,
500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. Note that these
high numbers do not represent single-event damage, as low probability
events will not occur simultaneously throughout the EU. In reality,
floods with these return periods have a very low probability of coin-
ciding, and yearly damages are substantially lower, as shown by the
EAD in Section 3.1. However, the values do provide an indication of the
significance of accounting for the influence of dike construction and
flood events on population growth in flood impact studies. For the
RCP2.6−SSP1 conditions we find a similar pattern with lower values:
an increase of between 3−9 billion euro across return periods for the
reactive government scenarios, and between 3−39 billion euro for the
proactive government scenarios (Supplementary Material B). In
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3 we include the SFDpop in all scenarios.
We performed both the Kolmogorov-smirnov test and a
Mann–Whitney U test to test if the distributions are different in mean,
variability, and shape. The analysis (Supplementary Material E) shows
that the distributions are significantly different (p ≤ 0.001). Only the
Mann–Whitney U for the 1000-year return period between
ProGov_BouRaHH_SFDpop and ReaGov_BouRaHH_SFDpop does not
show significant differences. However, as the Kolmogorov-smirnov test
does return low p value (p ≤ 0.001), we can still conclude that they
vary in median, variability or shape.
3.2.2. Increased impact due to proactive instead of reactive government
strategies
Besides the influence of dike construction and flood events on the
population, well-intended proactive policy strategies can also poten-
tially increase the impact of extreme flooding events, as households are
less likely to protect themselves if they are protected by large en-
gineering structures. Fig. 4 compares the ED for proactive
(EDProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop) and reactive (EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop)
government strategies for the different return periods. Indeed, the re-
sults show an increase in ED for all return periods when governments
act proactively (i.e. implement higher protection standards) instead of
reactively.
In absolute terms, the ED increases on average by approximately
151000 715000 and 1203000 euro/km2 and a median of approximately
23000 187000 268000 euro/km2 for the 100-year, 500-year and 1000-
year return periods, respectively if governments act proactively instead
of reactively. In relative terms, the average values translate into an
increase of between 4.4 and 8.6%, and the median translates into an
increase of between 4.4 and 5.9% for the 100-year return period to the
1000-year return period. However, a quarter of the regions exhibit a
relative median increase of 10% or higher across return periods, and
between 2−5% of the regions even show a relative increase in ED of
30% or higher, with some regions showing a twofold increase in ED.
The aggregated values for all regions in the EU further highlight the
effect of the safe development paradox, as the ED increases by ap-
proximately 4 billion, 53 billion and 84 billion euro for the 100-year,
500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. For the
RCP2.6−SSP1 scenario we estimate an increase of approximately
4 billion, 28 billion and 40 billion euro for the 100-year, 500-year and
1000-year return periods, respectively (Supplementary Material B). We
performed both the Kolmogorov-smirnov test and a Mann–Whitney U
test to test if the distributions are different in mean, variability, and
shape. The analysis (Supplementary Material E) shows that the dis-
tributions are significantly different (p ≤ 0.001).
Fig. 4 highlights the geospatial distribution of the results. As can be
expected, the greatest effect on ED in absolute numbers can be seen in
areas with high levels of exposure, such as in large metropolitan areas.
A proactive course generally leads to high protection standards in cities,
thus excluding them from the comparison of impacts for return periods
below 1000 years. However, when a disaster strikes (i.e. a flood with a
1000-year return period), our results show that moving from a reactive
to a proactive government strategy leads to an increase in ED of
3 million euro/km2 for the NUTS 3 area around Berlin, 5 million euro/
km2 for Rome, 6 million euro/km2 for Prague, 17 million euro/km2 for
Paris and Brussels, and 22 million euro/km2 for London in the year
2050. In relative terms the impact is more equally spread, with most of
England, Ireland, France, Belgium and the Czech Republic showing an
increase of 7% or more in ED. The same is true for central Italy, eastern
Fig. 2. Flood risk to residential buildings, expressed in EAD, for the period 2010−2050 for the RCP8.5−SSP5 scenario. The results are shown for proactive and
reactive governments, both including and excluding the influences of increased protection and flood events on population growth. Uncertainty bounds are based on
50 repetitions.
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Fig. 3. The average difference in ED in euro/km2 in 2050 under RCP8.5−SSP5 conditions when including and excluding SFDpop. A−C: Difference between the
scenarios in which the government acts reactively (EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop− EDReaGov+BouRaHH) for the 100-, 500-, and 1000-year return periods, respectively.
D−F: Difference between the scenarios in which the government acts proactively (EDProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop – EDProGov+BouRaHH) for the 100-, 500-, and 1000-year
return periods, respectively. ED values are set to zero if the protection standards in a scenario are higher than the return period.
Fig. 4. The average difference in ED in euro/km2 in 2050 under RCP8.5−SSP5 conditions when comparing the proactive and reactive scenarios with boundedly
rational households, including SFDpop (Difference=EDProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop− EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop). A: 100-year return period. B: 500-year return period. C:
1000-year return period. ED values are set to zero if the protection standards in a scenario are higher than the return period.
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Spain and southern Scandinavia.
The main driver behind this increase in ED when governments act
proactively lies in the decrease in protective measures taken by re-
sidents. When analysing the share of residential areas protected by
flood-proofing or elevating, we find a mean of 39% across regions for
the reactive scenario and a mean of 36% for the proactive scenario,
which in relative terms is an 8% decrease. Moreover, if we analyse the
regions in the lowest quartile of share of protected buildings, we find
that in the reactive scenario 16% of the residential buildings are pro-
tected by flood-proofing or elevating, while in the proactive scenario
this falls to 11%. In relative terms this is a decrease of 31%. While
increased protection standards in the proactive scenario lead to a sig-
nificant decrease in flood risk (EAD), they also lead to a decrease in
protective efforts made by households, and consequently an increase in
the impact of extreme events (ED).
3.3. Measures to counter the safe development paradox
3.3.1. Mandatory risk reduction: Building codes
Governments can actively counteract the safe development paradox.
One frequently applied policy is to implement mandatory building
codes, which forces new development to implement loss-reducing
measures. Fig. 5 shows how the ED changes if the government becomes
proactive, but also implements building codes in the form of mandatory
elevation, which is the most cost-effective measure for new buildings.
Compared to the results shown in Fig. 4, the difference in ED between
the proactive and reactive government strategies becomes significantly
lower.
When implementing mandatory elevation, the average reduction in
ED amounts to 31000, 372000 and 543000 euro/km2 and a median
reduction of 3000, 82000 and 103000 euro/km2 for the 100-, 500-, and
1000-year return periods, respectively. In relative terms we see a
median reduction of -1.8%, 1.8% and 1.6% across the analysed regions
for the 100-year, 500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively.
Note that the increase found for the 100-year return period is lower
than the increase of 4.4% found in Section 3.2.2. We find an aggregated
change of 10 million, 323 million and 532 million euro for the 100-
year, 500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. These find-
ings show the significant gain achieved by steering adaptive behaviour
towards the implementation of building-level measures. The statistical
analysis (Supplementary Material E) shows that the distributions are
significantly different (p ≤ 0.001). Only the Mann–Whitney U for the
1000-year return period between ProGov_BouRaHH_SFDpop and Pro-
Gov_BouRaHH_SFDpop does not show significant differences. However,
as the Kolmogorov-smirnov test does return low p value (p ≤ 0.001),
we can still conclude that they vary in median, variability or shape.
3.3.2. Voluntary risk reduction: incentives to act rationally
Governments can also counteract safe development by stimulating
voluntary risk reduction, for instance through tax reductions, subsidies
or awareness campaigns. Furthermore, insurance companies could offer
discounts on insurance premiums if households decide to implement
loss-reducing measures. Effectively, these measures stimulate more ra-
tional behaviour of residents, as modelled here in the RaHH scenario.
For both the 100-year and 500-year return periods, the proactive
strategy in which households act rationally leads to a reduction in ED in
all examined regions. For the 1000-year return period, most regions
show a reduction in ED, and the regions with an increased ED still have
a lower ED than they would have had if governments acted proactively
and households behaved rationally (Fig. 6). Regions in north-western
and central Europe, which face frequent flooding and generally have
greater exposed value, show a larger reduction in ED.
When households exhibit rational behaviour, the average reduction
in ED amounts to 511000 1835000 and 1503000 euro/km2 and a
median reduction of 147000 440000 and 343000 euro/km2 for the 100-
year, 500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. Note that the
1000-year return period yields a lower average reduction, as some re-
gions that were excluded from the 500-year return period (i.e. regions
where protection standards are >=500 years) are included in the
1000-year return period analysis. In relative terms we find a median
reduction of 21%, 14% and 9% across the analysed regions and an
aggregated change of 13 billion, 96 billion and 88 billion euro for the
100-year, 500-year and 1000-year return periods, respectively. For the
RCP2.6−SSP1 scenario we estimate a reduction of approximately
14 billion, 52 billion and 53 billion euro for the 100-year, 500-year and
1000-year return periods, respectively (Supplementary Material B).
These values indicate the significant gains achieved from steering
adaptive behaviour towards the increased implementation of building-
level measures. The statistical analysis (Supplementary Material E)
shows that the distributions are significantly different (p ≤ 0.001).
Fig. 5. The average difference in ED in euro/km2 in 2050 under RCP8.5-SSP5 conditions when comparing the proactive government scenario where new buildings
are elevated mandatorily through building codes versus a reactive government scenario without building codes. In both cases, households are boundedly rational
(Difference= EDProGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop+buildingcodes – EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop). A: 100-year return period. B: 500-year return period. C: 1000-year return period.
ED values are set to zero if the protection standards in a scenario are higher than the return period.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Safe development parameters
While this study provides key insights into the quantitative impacts
of the safe development paradox, the scope is limited to the economic
damage caused by extreme events. However, the consequences of the
safe development paradox potentially extend further. Our model in-
cludes a mechanism of population response by which the population in
a flood-prone region increases as a result of increased protection, in line
with the results of Collenteur et al. (2015), Husby et al. (2014) and
Burby (2006). As we show in Supplementary Material D, the population
in flood-prone areas increases significantly over the years when gov-
ernments act proactively. This leads to the prediction of roughly 76
million people living in flood-prone areas in 2050, compared to 66
million people in the baseline SSP scenario. Even when governments act
reactively, there are 1 million more people living in flood-prone areas
compared to the baseline. This increase in population is a proximate
warning for the potential increase in loss of life if a disaster strikes,
which is an important input in models used for determining optimal
flood protection levels (Jonkman and Vrijling, 2008). Furthermore,
although we capture dynamics relevant to the safe development
paradox by altering the SSP projection in flood-prone areas, the use of
SSPs still represents a static assumption regarding changes in demo-
graphy. However, flood events and climate change in general can have
non-linear effects on the displacement of people (López-Carr et al.,
2014; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013), migration flows (Gray and
Wise, 2016; Pasini and Amendola, 2019) and climate-induced reset-
tlement (López-Carr et al., 2014; López-Carr and Marter-Kenyon, 2015).
While this lies outside of the scope of this manuscript, capturing these
complex dynamics in addition to safe development dynamics would
improve future estimates of impact and risk.
Moreover, there are additional impacts to consider, such as en-
hanced societal disruption and the increase in indirect damages re-
sulting from the safe development paradox. Koks et al. (2015) showed
for the case study of an extreme event in Rotterdam Harbour that for
low-probability extreme events, indirect losses can outweigh direct
damages. Such indirect losses can be aggravated if, prior to a flood,
economic activities in flood-prone areas grew after protection standards
were increased. This effect might also cause indirect damage in un-
affected regions if an extreme event causes damage to critical
infrastructure (Koks et al., 2015). Further research should therefore
combine the analysis of direct damages as shown here with analysis of
the indirect impact of extreme events (Giesecke et al., 2012). Moreover,
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which is an example of the safe
development paradox (Baldassarre et al., 2015), it was shown that
lower income groups were affected more than higher income groups
(Kates et al., 2006; Masozera et al., 2007). This emphasises that social
injustice cannot be ignored when designing policies to reduce the ef-
fects of the safe development paradox. While out of the scope of this
research, ABMs could be designed to capture the complex processes of
urbanization, and could subsequently be utilized to capture social
segregation effects related to the safe development paradox. Moreover,
this study does not explicitly capture income variability and budget
constraints. As shown by (Hudson et al. 2019), for instance, the af-
fordability of certain adaptation strategies could influence the uptake of
the measure. In this study it would have resulted in a reduced uptake of
measures for all scenarios, leading to higher EAD and ED, while the
main conclusions would remain the same. However, future work could
benefit from the inclusion of budget constraints to further improve the
accuracy of the estimates.
In this study we use the only empirical data available on the effects
of flood occurrence and levee construction on population growth
Husby et al., 2014). However, as this data was specifically obtained for
the Netherlands, uncertainties are involved when applying it to dif-
ferent regions. Nevertheless, our sensitivity analysis (see Supplemen-
tary Material C) indicates that assuming the effect is twice as large or
twice as small has a minor influence on the overall ED results. When the
effect on population growth is twice as small, the effect on the ED is on
average 2.62% smaller. When the effect on population growth is twice
as large, the effect on the ED is on average 6.12% larger. However, the
sensitivity analysis also shows that, under certain circumstances, for
individual regions the percentage population change with respect to the
baseline can be larger. This is not only a result of the sensitivity, but can
also result from (1) the stochastic occurrence of flood events, (2) the
timing of increased government protection, and (3) the stochastic draw
from the triangular distribution for each event and each subsequent
year. Therefore, further research should focus on obtaining a wider
range of data on the effect of the safe development paradox on popu-
lation growth for different regions. This will enabled a more detailed
and robust analysis to be obtained on a smaller scale.
Finally, it is important to realize that the results on the safe
Fig. 6. The average difference in ED in euro/km2 in 2050 under RCP8.5−SSP5 conditions when comparing the proactive scenario in which households act rationally,
and the reactive scenarios in which households act boundedly rationally, which both include SFDpop
(Difference= EDProGov+RaHH+SFDpop− EDReaGov+BouRaHH+SFDpop). A: 100-year return period. B: 500-year return period. C: 1000-year return period. ED values are
set to zero if the protection standards in a scenario are higher than the return period.
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development paradox presented here are based on scenarios where all
governments are either reactive or proactive, and all households are
either boundedly rational or rational. In reality, there will most likely
be a gradual shift towards proactive governmental action in the EU,
following the EU Floods Directive. Moreover, policies that steer
household behaviour towards rational behaviour might not achieve this
completely, and it will surely not be implemented at the same time nor
in the same way in different EU member states. Alternatively, govern-
ments could apply other means which have less impact on the ED, such
as the construction of reservoirs or the restriction of building in risk
zones altogether. However, our results effectively provide an upper and
lower bound of the effects of the safe development paradox for the EU,
and signal the importance of developing policy measures to counteract
the negative effects.
4.2. Policy implications
Our results confirm that the increasing protection provided by large
engineering structures can cause an increased impact of extreme events
due to greater exposure. This enhanced exposure results from popula-
tion growth effects that follow increased protection or flood events, and
thus increased vulnerability, as people neglect to take building-level
measures. While the reduction of yearly average risk remains an im-
portant input variable for economic decision-making, our results show
that careful consideration is needed of the negative side-effects of
proactive policies. Frameworks such the EU Floods Directive (EU,
2007), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN, 2015)
and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
(UNFCCC, 2013) acknowledge and stimulate local measures that could
reduce adverse effects, but not in the context of countering such effects
of well-intended large-scale measures. Without explicitly incorporating
policies against these adverse effects in adaptation strategies, extreme
flood events will cause more damage and potentially lead to large-scale
disruption of society.
To reduce the economic impacts of extreme events, governments or
local authorities could stimulate voluntary or mandatory building-level
measures. Measures such as flood-proofing or elevating would reduce
the economic damage caused by floods that overtop the design level of
protection standards. While such measures are often economically ra-
tional to take (Aerts et al., 2014; Kreibich et al., 2011; Poussin et al.,
2015), people are generally not inclined to implement them. An ex-
ample can be seen in the Netherlands, where high protection standards
lead to low awareness and few measures being implemented at the
household level, while households situated outside the embankments
often have elevated houses. Section 3.3.1 shows that such mandatory
building codes, in this case elevation, indeed reduce the effects of the
safe development paradox. Therefore, when choosing a proactive gov-
ernment strategy aimed at large-scale protection, policies need be
aimed at stimulating the implementation of building-level measures to
reduce the impact of extreme events that overtop the design levels of
dikes and levees.
While governments are well positioned to stimulate such building-
level measures through tax deduction, subsidies and building codes, the
implementation of policy and regulation by governmental institutes is
usually slow (Surminski et al., 2015). In contrast, market mechanisms
can lead to swift changes in behaviour and might therefore be better
positioned to stimulate household adaptation (Surminski et al., 2015).
Previous studies suggest that the insurance sector could play a vital role
in stimulating the implementation of loss-reducing measures
(Botzen et al., 2009; Kunreuther, 1996). For instance, insurance against
flood damage could be combined with an insurance premium discount
if households install flood-proofing or elevate their houses. Botzen et al.
(2009) show that households might be willing to adopt loss-reducing
measures if they receive a premium discount, while Haer et al. (2016)
prove that this could significantly contribute to reducing the impact of
flood events. Section 3.3.2 shows how such measures that effectively
aim to stimulate more rational household behaviour might be effective
in counteracting the safe development paradox.
Moreover, our results show that a major role should be played by
large metropolitan areas such as the NUTS 3 regions around Paris and
Brussels. In relative terms these areas might be less subjected to the safe
development paradox, but as a result of their high exposed value they
are hit hardest in absolute terms. While government-led initiatives can
force or stimulate cities to reduce their vulnerability to extreme events,
cities themselves are increasingly becoming leaders in climate adapta-
tion. For instance, initiatives like C40 Cities2 and the Sustainable Cities
Institute3 are emerging, through which cities themselves take on the
responsibility to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and as-
sociated impacts. In this study we indicate the importance of combining
large-scale protective efforts with local-level or building-level mea-
sures. Considering their knowledge of the local situation, cities them-
selves can best determine where extreme events could impact, for in-
stance, critical infrastructure, businesses, or social and cultural
hotspots. As such, they can stimulate or implement tailor-made policies,
regulations and measures that are appropriate for infrequent but highly
disruptive events.
The solutions offered to limit the adverse effects of the safe devel-
opment paradox are not only confined to building-level measures.
Studies have shown that flood-prone regions experience significant
development (Hallegatte et al., 2013), which in combination with in-
creased public protection can lead to a significantly larger impact of
extreme events, as shown in this study. Therefore, it should be carefully
considered if new development is desirable in the face of flood risk and
the safe development paradox, or if new development has to be regu-
lated, for instance by mandatory flood-proofing, or even prohibited in
certain high-risk areas (Stevens et al., 2010). Of course, this should also
be carefully weighted, as the benefits of development in risk areas
might be larger than the potential losses. Therefore, it is important to
institutionalize flood awareness and flood adaptation strategies within
local government planning, by forcing local governments to include
adaptation planning in comprehensive development plans, for example
(Burby, 2006).
5. Conclusion
In this study we analyse and quantify the consequences of the so-
called safe development paradox for the EU, by using an ABM that
integrates the adaptive behaviour of governments and households with
a large-scale flood risk assessment. We adapt this model to better cap-
ture the change in population growth which can occur after a flood
event, or after governments increase protection, as this in turn leads to
higher exposed values. Thus, this study quantifies the economic impact
of the safe development paradox on a continental scale, which results in
three main conclusions.
First, based on our findings we can conclude that the change in
population growth caused by the safe development paradox is an im-
portant addition to risk assessments, as it leads to higher exposure and
higher damages. Depending on how governments act, which in our
model can be reactively or proactively, including this effect on popu-
lation growth leads, for the 500-year return period, to an increase in ED
of between 12 and 38 billion euro under RCP8.5−SSP5 conditions, and
between 8 and 26 billion euro under RCP2.6−SSP1 conditions. Note
that this does not refer to single-event damage, but the aggregated in-
crease in ED for extreme events summed for all regions in the EU.
Second, proactive government decision-making leads to lower
yearly flood risk but higher impacts of extreme events, compared to a
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protective efforts by households. In this case, the aggregated ED of
floods with extreme return periods in the EU is estimated to increase by
53 billion euro for the 500-year return period under RCP8.5−SSP5
conditions, and 28 billion euro under RCP2.6−SSP1 conditions. While
this should not be interpreted as single-event damage, it does signal the
significant negative effect of proactive large-scale protection decisions
by governments.
Third, based on our findings we conclude that steering household
behaviour towards rational behaviour (i.e. no underestimation or
overestimation of risk) leads to greater implementation of building-
level measures, which counteracts the negative effects of proactive
government action. We do not go into depth on the exact type of
steering mechanisms that should be used, but this could be a discount
on an insurance policy if a household implements risk-reducing mea-
sures, for example. When households are steered towards fully rational
behaviour, the aggregated ED is actually lowered across return periods.
For instance, for the 500-year return period, ED is 96 billion euro lower
under RCP8.5−SSP5 conditions, and 52 billion euro lower under
RCP2.6−SSP1 conditions, despite the proactive instalment of large-
scale protection by governments.
This research provides the first quantification of the economic ef-
fects of the safe development paradox. However, we also highlight as-
pects that should be addressed by further research, such as the effects
on loss of life, business interruptions, and impacts on critical infra-
structure. Further research could also focus on developing detailed re-
gional data that can feed into the large-scale model, and acquiring
detailed empirical data on behavioural aspects, which could help to
improve estimates for household behaviour.
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